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From Death to Near-Death: The Fate of Serious
Youthful Offenders after Roper v. Simmons
Christopher A. Mallett*

INTRODUCTION
The United States juvenile death penalty was abolished in
2005 when the Supreme Court, in Roper v. Simmons, found this
punishment to be cruel and unusual and in violation of the
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.1 This decision was the final
step in ending the death sentence for those under the age of
eighteen. While this sentence is no longer an option for
retributively-inclined states, many serious youthful offenders
continue to meet similar, and in some ways, comparably difficult
fates. These fates include the wholesale transfer of serious
youthful offenders to the criminal courts2 and the subsequent
incarceration of tens of thousands of troubled adolescents;3 and

*Christopher A. Mallett, Ph.D., Esq., LISW, is Associate Professor at
Cleveland State University’s School of Social Work (c.a.mallett@csuohio.edu;
216-523-7514).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
See Patrick Griffin, Nat’l. Center for Juvenile Justice, National Overviews,
State Juvenile Justice Profiles (2003); Christopher A. Mallett, Death is Not
Different: The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal Courts, 43
Crim. L. Bull. 523 (2007); Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Transfer of
Juveniles to Adult Court: Effects of a Broad Policy on One Court, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2007).
3 See Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile
Incarceration (2012); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
OJJDP
Statistical
Briefing
Book
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08201.asp?qaDate=2010;
Melissa Sickmund, Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997 to 2008, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2010).
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for a smaller subset of this group, their imprisonment for life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP).4
This review of the juvenile death penalty - its history,
impact, and extinction – does not end with the 2005 Roper
decision. While the abolishment of life-ending sentences for
adolescent offenders is no longer an option for judicial officers,
its punitive paradigm has been far-reaching, and its alternative –
life without the possibility of parole – much more common. This
Article is in two-parts: 1) the analysis of the recent juvenile death
penalty era (1976 to 2005) and federal and Supreme Court
doctrine that eventually ended executions; and 2) post-Roper, the
continued dismal state for serious youthful offenders, most who
suffer from significant disabilities, trauma, and education
deficits, with thousands sentenced to life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. This country has shifted from the
juvenile death penalty era to the juvenile near-death penalty era.

JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY: 1976 TO 2005
The death penalty has been used to execute adolescents in
this country for over 300 years across varying offenses, though
during the recent juvenile death penalty era (1976 to 2005) the
offense had to have been first-degree or aggravated murder.5
There had been, on average, one execution of an adolescent
annually since the founding of this country, with twenty-two (of
a total 226 who were sentenced to death) occurring since 1973.6
The death-sentencing of adolescents declined during the
most recent three-decade era, beginning with a four-year
moratorium declared in 1972 by the Supreme Court finding this
sentence unconstitutional. The Court held the death penalty (for
4 See Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings From a National
Survey, The Sentencing Project, Wash., D.C. (2012).
5 Mallett, supra note 2; Mirah A. Horowitz, Kids Who Kill: A Critique of How
the American Legal System Deals with Juveniles Who Commit Homicide, 63
Law & Contemp. Probs. 135 (2000).
6 See Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes (2005).

juveniles and adults) to be unconstitutional due to arbitrary and
capricious state sentencing standards.7 When the Court
reestablished the death penalty as constitutional in 1976, it
directed the sentencing authority to consider relevant mitigating
circumstances to the offense and a range of factors about the
individual defendant.8 In striking down mandatory capital
sentencing statutes that existed prior to 1972, the Court found
the flaw to be a failure to permit the presentation of mitigating
circumstances: “[T]he Eighth Amendment,” explained the Court,
“requires consideration of the character and record of the
individual . . . as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.”9 As will be seen, this
mitigating circumstance evidentiary standard was often not met
for juvenile death (and, later, near-death) sentenced individuals.
Mitigating Evidence
From the 1976 Furman decision to the turn of the twentyfirst century, the Court continued to reinforce and expand
mitigating evidence requirements in capital cases. The Court
recognized that in order to support individualized sentencing
requirements in capital cases the sentencing authority must be
permitted to consider any aspect of a defendant’s character or
record and any of the offense circumstances,10 and that troubled
childhood histories must be considered a mitigating factor.11
Subsequently, the Court found that jury instructions may not
limit jury consideration of these mitigating circumstances, a
significant step in having all parties be aware of the defendant’s
background.12

Furman v. Georgia, 408, U.S. 238 (1972).
Gregg v. Georgia, 428, U.S. 153 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
9 Woodson v. California, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976). The Court continued that
“without this consideration, the possibility of compassionate or mitigating
factors could not be reviewed in light of the frailties of humankind. Fixed
death penalty sentencing guidelines treat human beings as members of a
faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death.”
10 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
11 Eddings v. Oklahoma,436 U.S. 921 (1978).
12 Hitchcock v. Dugger, 381 U.S. 393 (1987).
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The Court further found that the defendant’s character
and background are relevant because of society’s belief that a
disadvantaged upbringing, emotional difficulties, or mental
problems may diminish offenders’ moral culpability.13 Indeed,
the Court has posited that “[t]he sentence imposed at the death
penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the
defendant’s background, character, and crime”14 and must
consider both the tangibles and intangibles of the defendant.15
In some cases, evidence of drug abuse, brain damage, and
poverty must be reviewed by the sentencing authority.16 And
more recently, it was held unequivocal that evidence from
childhood difficulties must be presented to the sentencing
authority.17 The Court determined that the following evidence
should be considered at sentencing of defendants: child
borderline mental retardation, child physical abuse, parent
imprisonment for child neglect, and reunification of the child
with the abusive parent after prison release. In addition, the
Court faulted the absence of jury instructions informing the jury
that it could consider and give effect to the defendant’s mental
retardation and history of abuse.18
It became clear doctrine that for a death sentence to be
appropriately determined, the youthful offenders’ histories and
difficulties must have been identified and presented to the
sentencing authority. Unfortunately, the failure to identify and
review such childhood background, difficulties, traumas, and
disabilities was common in capital cases. Of the fifty-three
juvenile offenders on death row in 2002, only twenty-six of the
offenders’ background or mitigating histories were presented at
trial, with five of the juries hearing only that the offender was an
adolescent.19 Of these juvenile offender backgrounds not
presented at trial, a majority had histories of traumatic abuse,

California v. Brown, 429 U.S. 538 (1987).
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
15 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 427 U.S. 320 (1985).
16 Hitchcock, 381 U.S. 393.
17 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
18 Williams, 529 U.S. at 370-71.
19 Mallett, supra note 2.
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mental health problems, school failure, and poverty.20 In a
second review of twenty executed juveniles, similar outcomes
were found in that nine had medically documented brain
damage; however, only two of these adolescents’ jury trials were
presented with this mitigating evidence (as seen in Table 1).21
Table 1 – Juveniles Sentenced to Death
Juveniles Sentenced to Death22
Minority (African-American or Hispanic)
Mitigating Histories
Maltreatment victimization
Poverty experienced
Serious mental health disorders
Developmentally delayed (mental
retardation)
Substance abuse disorders
School failure
Brain damage

%
56
68
55
37
31
30
28
17

Sentencing
In two decisions, the Court narrowed the use of the death
penalty and ultimately abolished its application to those less
than eighteen years of age. In Atkins v. Virginia, it was found
that youthful offenders with low intellectual functioning could
not be sentenced to death because their disabilities limited
impulse control and judgment abilities, “[t]hey do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious
adult criminal conduct.”23 The Court further reasoned that the
use of this severe punishment neither afforded retribution for
the offender’s act nor deterrence.24 This decision was important
in providing serious youthful (and adult) offenders with
Mallett, supra note 2.
See American Bar Association, Juvenile Death Penalty Report (2003).
22 Mallett, supra note 2; American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Death
Penalty Report (2000).
23 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002).
24 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
20
21

significant developmental disabilities respite from the death
penalty.
And ultimately, in Roper, the Court found youthful
offenders less culpable for similar impulse control reasons,
among others, but went further to find adolescence itself a
mitigating factor.25 This was not the first Court holding or
commentary on juvenile offender culpability; early, the Court in
Johnson v. Texas wrote, “the signature qualities of youth are
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”26
Yet in Roper, the Court found relevant differences between those
under eighteen years of age and adults so consequential as to not
classify adolescents among the worst offenders.27 These
differences included an underdeveloped sense of responsibility
leading to impetuous actions as well as a lack of maturity,28
lessened character development,29 and vulnerability to negative
influences and outside peer pressure.30 For these reasons
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (“The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives
from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals
mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger
years can subside.”). This was not the first Court holding or commentary on
juvenile offender culpability, for in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837
(1988), it was acknowledged that “teenagers capacity for growth” and in
Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993), the Court stated “the signature
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.”
26 Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368.
27 Roper, 543 U.S. at 556 (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their
identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”).
28 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense
of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous
and ill-considered actions and decisions.”).
29 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed.”).
30 Roper, 543 U.S. at 557 (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time
and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and
to psychological damage. This is explained in part by the prevailing
circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control,
over their own environment.”).
25

“almost every State prohibits those under eighteen years of age
from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental
consent.”31 The juvenile death penalty was thus abolished; these
individuals were resentenced to juvenile life without the
possibility of parole.
This is not the end of the story. Though executions of
juvenile offenders are barred, the long-term and life-time
incarceration of these similarly-situated serious youthful
offenders is today’s quagmire.

JUVENILE NEAR-DEATH PENALTY: 2005 TO PRESENT
A harsh, punitive paradigm continues to dominate the
criminal justice system for serious youthful offenders,
particularly those who have committed some of the more tragic
offenses (murder, sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated assault);
LWOP sentences are allowed for only aggravated murder or
homicide in the states that utilize this punishment. Though
reform efforts, state budgetary difficulties, and litigation
concerning unconstitutional care and dangerous facilities have
reduced the number of youthful offender incarcerations over the
past decade, little has changed for the subset of juveniles who
have committed these serious personal crimes. These youthful
offenders are often incarcerated in juvenile and adult prisons,
and for those who have committed murder, receive long
incarceration sentences, and, for some, a life-time prison term.32
Incarceration
More than 60,000 youthful offenders are confined each
day in the United States by order of a juvenile court.33 The most
common placement for these committed adolescents is a locked,
long-term state facility that typically hold hundreds of youthful
offenders at one time, in prison-like environments with locked

Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
Supra note 3.
33 Supra note 3.
31
32

cell blocks, and provide minimal rehabilitative services.34 These
incarcerations in juvenile justice facilities do not include
youthful offenders transferred to the adult criminal courts, a
controversial procedure that bifurcates the youthful offender
population often without sufficient safeguards for the
adolescent.35 While estimates vary, 2,500 to 10,000 youthful
offenders are held in adult jails and prisons each day, in addition
to the 60,000 in juvenile facilities.36 A majority of this
incarcerated population is older (sixteen- and seventeen-year
olds), male (87%), and minority (68%) adolescents. Of the
minority group, approximately 60% are African-American, 33%
are Hispanic, and, depending on the jurisdiction, between 1-4%
are American Indian or Asian,37 a phenomenon known as
disproportionate minority confinement (DMC) and found in
nearly all states (those formerly on death row were also
disproportionately minority)38 Almost all youthful offenders
sentenced to LWOP have detention, recidivism, and
incarceration histories.
Sentencing and Mitigating Evidence

Supra note 3.
See Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border
Disputes, 18 Future of Children 81 (2008); Simon Singer, Recriminalizing
Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform (1996).
36 See Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State
Transfer Laws and Reporting, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, Wash.,
D.C. (2011); State Trends: Legislative Victories from 2005 to 2010: Removing
Youth from the Adult Criminal Justice System, Campaign for Youth Justice,
Wash., D.C. (2011); Todd D. Minton, Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear,
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S., Department of
Justice, Wash., D.C. (2010).
37 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP Statistical
Briefing
Book
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08201.asp?qaDate=2010; Paul
Tracy et al., Gender Differences in Delinquency and Juvenile Justice
Processing: Evidence from National Data, 55 Crime & Delinq. 171 (2009).
38 See Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate Minority Contact, 18 Future of
Children 59 (2008); National Council on Crime and Delinquency, And Justice
for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System,
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Oakland, Cal. (2007).
34
35

After Roper, the Constitution’s Eighth Amendment
requires punishment to be proportioned to the youthful offender
offense.39 A key factor in this proportionality determination is
the culpability of the offender.40 Since 2005, two Court decisions
have narrowed the available use of the most severe criminal
punishments for serious youthful offenders, finding certain
sentences violated the Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.
In Graham v. Florida, the Court found that sentencing nonhomicide offending youthful offenders to life without the
possibility of parole was unconstitutional. In so holding, the
Court reinforced and relied upon their Roper decision in
reiterating that youthful offenders are different from adults and
that these characteristics mean that “[i]t is difficult even for
expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”41 The Court further found that
“developments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior
control continue to mature through late adolescence.”42 The
Court decision, however, did not extend this Constitutional
protection to youthful offenders sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole for homicide crimes.43
This constitutional protection from certain LWOP
sentences for youthful offenders convicted of homicide was
extended in Miller v. Alabama. The Court furthered the reasoning
from Roper and, more significantly from Graham, in finding that a
youthful offender convicted of homicide and sentenced by a
mandatory state statute to LWOP was unconstitutional.44 The
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
Roper, 543 at 559-70; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Ennund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797-801 (1982).
41 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
42 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
43 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029.
44 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
39
40

Court determined that these mandatory laws “run[] afoul of our
cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants
facing the most serious penalties.”45 The Court went further in
addressing mitigating evidence in finding, “[m]andatory life
without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his
chronological age and its hallmark features – among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences. It prevents taking into account the family and
home environment that surrounds him – and from which he
cannot usually extricate himself – no matter how brutal or
dysfunctional.”46
The law today allows the sentencing of youthful offenders
convicted of homicide to LWOP, but only after the sentencing
court has investigated and reviewed the adolescent’s mitigating
evidence, involvement in the offense, and related matters.
Specifically, a sentencing authority must consider the
adolescent’s age and impact on maturity and appreciation of
consequences, the family and home environment, the offense
circumstances including involvement level and influence of
peers, the adolescent’s level of sophistication in dealing with the
adult criminal justice system, and the possibility for
rehabilitation. This mitigation investigation should be thorough
and identify important developmental, family, maltreatment,
mental health, and other related disability circumstances that the
adolescent suffers or has suffered from, and in particular, those
that impacted the commission of the crime.47
Near-Death Sentenced Mitigating Histories
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller was a step
forward in eliminating mandatory state LWOP sentences, yet
this still allows the LWOP sentence after a review of mitigating
and offense specific evidence. The constitutional right granted
in Miller may still not be guaranteed if important mitigating
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
47 Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 24644.
45
46

evidence is not uncovered and presented to the sentencing
authority.
This may be problematic because those in the population
serving a LWOP sentence often have very difficult and traumatic
mitigating histories, something not always readily identified. In
a review of 1,579 individuals serving these sentences in 2012, the
following was found (though not all was presented to the earlier
sentencing authority): 32% had been raised in public housing;
and almost 20% were homeless, living with a friend, in a
detention center, or a group home prior to incarceration; nearly
half (47%) experienced physical abuse, including almost 80% of
females; 21% were victims of sexual abuse, including 77% of
females; 40% had been enrolled in special education classes; 84%
had been suspended or expelled from school, including 53% that
were not enrolled in school at the time of the crime.48
The incarcerated serious youthful offender population
(most not serving life sentences, and in either long-term juvenile
or adult facilities) have similar mitigating histories and
difficulties. In fact, most suffer disproportionately from
educational deficits and related learning problems, mental
health/substance abuse disorders, and/or maltreatment
victimizations.49 The prevalence rates of these mitigating
difficulties in the incarcerated serious youthful offending
population can be quite astounding. Reviews of this population
over the past two decades have found significantly higher
incidences of these disorders and maltreatment victimizations –
from two (for some mental health disorders) to as many as sixty

Nellis, supra note 4.
See John H. Lemmon, How Child Maltreatment Affects Dimensions of
Juvenile Delinquency in a Cohort of Low-Income Urban Males 16 Just. Q. 357
(2009); Ilhong Yun et al., Disentangling the Relationship Between Child
Maltreatment and Violent Delinquency: Using a Nationally Representative
Sample, 26 J. Interpersonal Violence 88 (2011); Christopher A. Mallett, Seven
Things Juvenile Courts Should Know About Learning Disabilities, National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Reno, Nev. (2011); Christopher
A. Mallett et al., Predicting Juvenile Delinquency: The Nexus of Child
Maltreatment, Depression, and Bipolar Disorder, 19 Crim. Behav. & Mental
Health 235 (2009).
48
49

times (for maltreatment victimization) the rates found in the
general adolescent population (see Table 2).50
Table 2 – Incarcerated and Non-Incarcerated Adolescent
Comparisons

Minority (African-American or
Hispanic)
Life Histories
Maltreatment victimization
Special education disabilities
Mental health disorders
Substance abuse

Incarcerated
Youthful
Offender
Population (%)
68

Adolescent
Population
(%)

34-60
28-45
35-80
30-70

1
4-9
9-18
4-5

36

These difficulties are often linked to the offending
behaviors. Maltreatment victimization and related trauma
experiences are not only harmful to adolescents, but for many
lead to serious offending behavior risks – including school
difficulties, mental health disorders, and substance abuse
problems.51 Adolescents with maltreatment histories who do
See Laurie Chassin, Juvenile Justice and Substance Abuse, 18 Future of
Children 165 (2008); Daniel P. Mears & Laudan Y. Aron, Addressing the
Needs of Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: The Current
State of Knowledge, Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center, Wash., D.C. (2003);
Linda Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders of Youth in Detention, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2006); Jason J. Washburn et al.,
Psychiatric Disorders Among Detained Youths: A Comparison of Youths
Processed in Juvenile Court and Adult Criminal Court, 59 Psychiatric Services
965 (2008).
51 See J. David Hawkins et al., Predictors of Youth Violence, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice, Wash., D.C. (2000); Heather A. Turner et al., The Effect
of Lifetime Victimization on the Mental Health of Children and Adolescents,
62 Soc. Sci. & Med. 13 (2006); Jeffrey Leiter, School Performance Trajectories
After the Advent of Reported Maltreatment, 29 Children & Youth Services
Rev. 363 (2007).
50

not complete high school, those in foster care who are truant or
change schools often, and those aging out of the child welfare
system are at high risk for incarceration.52
Mental health problems are often severe within the
incarcerated youthful offender population: psychotic, mood, and
post-traumatic stress disorders are common.53 Of particular
concern is a subset of these troubled adolescents (between 5-10%
of those with a mental health diagnosis) who develop serious
emotional disturbances that substantially impact functioning.54
Those in this group have long histories of multiple mental health
disorders and related problems (often substance abuse and
trauma) that continue into young adulthood, and constitute 20%
of incarcerated youthful offenders in most states.55 Experiencing
these traumas and difficulties – in particular, poor parenting,
abuse and neglect, and severe mental health problems (including
psychopathic traits) – are predictors of adolescent violence and,
for some, homicide.56

See Joseph P. Ryan et al., Maltreatment and Delinquency: Investigating
Child Welfare Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing, 29 Children & Youth
Services Rev. 1035 (2007).
53 See Robert Kinscherff, A Primer for Mental Health Practitioners Working
with Youth Involved in the Juvenile Justice System, Technical Assistance
Partnership for Child and Family Mental Health, Wash., D.C. (2012); Jennifer
Wareham & Denise Paquette Boots, The Link Between Mental Health
Problems and Youth Violence in Adolescence, 39 Crim. Just. & Behav. 1002
(2012).
54 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Mental
Health, United States, 2008, Center for Mental Health Services, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Wash., D.C. (2008).
55 See John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Juvenile Justice and
Mental Health: A Collaborative Approach, Models for Change: Systems
Reform in Juvenile Justice, Chicago, Ill. (2012); Joseph J. Cocozza & Kathleen
Skowyra, Youth with Mental Health Disorders: Issues and Emerging
Responses, 7 Juvenile Just. J. 3 (2000).
56 See Kathleen Heide, Young Killers: The Challenge of Juvenile Homicide
(1999); Matt DeLisi & Glen Walters, Multiple Homicide as a Function of
Prisonization and Concurrent Instrumental Violence: Testing an Interaction
Model – Research Note, 47 Crime & Delinq. 147 (2011); Alex Piquero, John
MacDonald et al., Self-Control, Violent Offending, and Homicide
Victimization: Assessing the General Theory of Crime, 21 J. Quantitative
Criminology 55 (2005).
52

ROPER AND ABOLISHMENT: DEATH PROBLEM REDEFINED
LWOP’s Disproportionate Impact
The LWOP sentence is much more widely available than
the former juvenile death penalty sentence. There are between
1,755 and 2,574 serious youthful offenders currently serving a
LWOP sentence in thirty-four states,57 representing a majority of
states that allow this sentence.58 By comparison, in 2005, only
seventy-one serious youthful offenders were on death row. In
addition, from 1973 to 2005, only twenty-five states allowed this
death sentencing, while most states did not ever sentence a
juvenile to death row (see Table 3).59
Table 3 – Death Penalty and LWOP Sentencing Comparison
Juvenile Death Penalty Sentencing
(1973-2005)

Juvenile LWOP Sentencing

22 Executions (226 ever sentenced)60

2,524 Serving LWOP in 201261

See Christopher A. Mallett, Juvenile Life Without the Possibility of Parole,
35 Children & Youth Services Rev. 743 (2013).
58 See Ashley Nellis & Ryan S. King, No Exit: The Expanding Use of Life
Sentences in America, The Sentencing Project (2009). There is some
controversy in identifying the exact number of LWOP-sentenced youthful
offenders because of different definitions utilized: some researchers use an
expanded “juvenile” definition of all offenders under the age of eighteen, not
just those based on state law definitions (whereby some sixteen-and
seventeen-year-olds when transferred to adult criminal court are no longer
counted as juveniles), and find the higher prevalence rates. See Human Rights
Watch, State Distribution of Estimated 2,574 Juvenile Offenders Serving
Juvenile Life without Parole (Rest of their Lives 2009 Update), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenileoffenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole); Paulo G. Annino et al.,
Juvenile Life without Parole for Non-Homicide Offenses: Florida Compared
to Nation, Public Interest Law Center, Fla. St. U. (2009).
59 Streib, supra note 6.
60 Streib, supra note 6.
61 The most recent data on the number of youthful offenders serving a LWOP
sentence (as of November 2012) is from the University of San Francisco’s
School of Law’s State by State Legal Resource Guide, available at
http://www.usfca.edu/law/jlwop/resource_guide/.
57

Texas (13)
Florida
Alabama
Louisiana (1)
Mississippi
Georgia (1)
North Carolina
Arizona
Oklahoma (2)
South Carolina (1)
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Virginia (3)
Missouri (1)
Indiana
Kentucky
Maryland
Nevada
Arizona
Delaware
New Jersey
Washington
Arkansas
Idaho
Utah

Texas (4)
Florida (266)
Alabama (62)
Louisiana (355)
Mississippi (24)
Washington (28)
North Carolina (44)
Arizona (32)
Oklahoma (49)
South Carolina (26)
Pennsylvania (444)
Ohio (2)
Virginia (56)
Missouri (116)
Delaware (7)
Arizona (32)
Maryland (13)
Nevada (21)
Total = 1,582

Juvenile Death Penalty was not Available; LWOP is
Available
Illinois (103)
Massachusetts (57)
Nebraska (24)
South Dakota (9)
California (250)
Hawaii (4)
Idaho (4)
New Hampshire (3)
North Dakota (1)
Tennessee (4)
Arkansas (73)
Iowa (44)
Michigan (346)
Minnesota (2)
Rhode Island (2)
Connecticut (9)

Delaware (7)
Total = 942
It is worth reinforcing that there are ten times as many
youthful offenders serving a LWOP sentence today than were
ever sentenced to death between 1976 and 2005. In eighteen
states that allow a LWOP sentence, and that also allowed past
juvenile death penalty sentences, there are 1,582 youthful
offenders imprisoned for life. Additionally, in the seventeen
states that did not allow a past juvenile death penalty sentence
there are 942 youthful offenders currently imprisoned for life.
While these numbers may decrease with the impact of the Miller
decision, the LWOP sentence continues to be utilized across a
majority of states, with a disproportionate impact in a few states
(Florida, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, California, and Michigan),
similar to the juvenile death penalty sentencing era and its
disproportionate usage in a few states (Texas, Virginia, and
Louisiana). However, it is also quite possible that these LWOP
sentencing levels may continue indefinitely for there is no
current Supreme Court case scheduled to review or further the
Miller decision, though a number of advocates may pursue this
in certain federal district courts.62
Not only are LWOP sentences more widely available and
utilized than the former juvenile death penalty sentence, its
outcome equally hopeless. When an adolescent is sentenced
without even the possibility of a parole hearing in future
decades, this is a near-death experience: no options, no
rehabilitation, and nothing will change this future.
Unfortunately, the incarceration experience itself, beyond this
lack of hope for redemption, harms the youthful offender. Time
spent in these facilities gravely impacts adolescent development
and decreases cognitive and social functioning. A majority of
the LWOP sentenced population is sixteen or seventeen years
old, and adolescents of this age have deficiencies in decisionIn particular, the Equal Justice Initiative in Montgomery, Alabama, the
group responsible for shepherding the Miller case through the federal courts
to the Supreme Court.
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making ability, greater vulnerability to external coercion, and an
underdeveloped character.63 Incarceration also significantly
lessens adolescents’ abilities to function independently because
of the rigid expectations of the facility, and social and coping
skills are diminished for similar reasons.64 Incarceration
facilities lack necessary rehabilitation services, separate the
adolescents from their families, and are often dangerous and
violent environments.65
Social Quagmire
One of the most disturbing realities of youthful offenders
who were formerly sentenced to death and today are imprisoned
for life is that most had such traumatized and difficult
backgrounds. Most did not make it unscathed into young
adulthood because of gravely harmful experiences, including
poverty, highly dysfunctional families, school and learning
failures, severe mental health problems, and for most, a
comorbid impact of multiple difficulties. Delinquency,
detention, and incarceration are often the outcomes for these
adolescent difficulties.
However, there is more to this unhappy ending: social
and political factors also impact the pathway to incarceration
and, for some, a life prison term. As discussed earlier, a
disproportionate number of the LWOP-sentenced youthful
offenders are minority (African-American, Hispanic, and
depending on the jurisdiction, American Indian or Asian), with a
concentration of these sentences occurring in a fairly small
number of states (Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina,
Illinois, California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Oklahoma, and

See Elizabeth Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 Future of Children 16 (2008); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, 58 Am.
Psychologist 1009 (2003).
64 See Julia Dmitrieva et al., Arrested Development: The Effects of
Incarceration on the Development of Psychosocial Maturity, 24 Dev. &
Psychopathology 1073 (2012).
65 Supra note 3.
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Massachusetts).66 In a recent study of LWOP sentences across all
states, it was found that race and the election of judges had
significant impacts on outcomes. States that have the most
African-Americans and have judges that are elected (and not
appointed) sentence the most youthful offenders to life terms in
prison; in other words, more politically conservative states
disproportionately sentence minorities to LWOP sentences.
Abolish LWOP
LWOP sentences are near-death experiences for the
youthful offender, similar to the abolished juvenile death
penalty. These sentences impact a far greater number of
adolescents across most states and are influenced by racial
politics and other nefarious factors. A majority of those who are
LWOP-sentenced are poor, minority, and troubled young
people. For these and other related reasons, the Supreme Court
should determine that a juvenile LWOP sentence is cruel and
unusual punishment and hold it to be unconstitutional. A
society is not judged by the success of its most able-bodied but
by how it treats its most disadvantaged.

In late 2012 a federal court in Michigan ordered the review of all LWOPsentenced youthful offenders based on the Miller decision. In addition, in
nearly a dozen states, their respective Supreme Courts are revisiting the
sentences of many currently LWOP-sentenced youthful offenders, based on
the Miller decision; however, it is not clear whether Miller can be applied
retroactively. Moving forward, though, there is some positive news for
youthful offenders and these severe sentences: California, Delaware, and
Wyoming eliminated LWOP sentences; and Arkansas, Louisiana, Nebraska,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah have placed greater
restrictions on the use of LWOP. However, mandatory minimum legislation
was defeated in Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Washington.
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